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Summary 
•  Has poverty increased or decreased in Sweden during the last two dec-
ades? The answer to this question depends on the definition of poverty. 
In relative terms poverty has increased due to increasing income differ-
ences, but in absolute terms poverty has decreased following increasing 
real incomes. 
•  Between 5 and 11 per cent of the population ended up in absolute po-
verty between 1991 and 2007. The proportions were much higher for 
those living alone, for young adults, and for immigrants, particularly 
those newly arrived. 
•  Half of the poor leave poverty already the year after entry. The group of 
poor therefore is composed to a large extent by those who are long-term 
poor. For those who have once been poor, the risk is high to return to 
poverty. 
•  Poverty is strongly associated with economic recession and growth. 
When the macroeconomic conditions are favourable fewer become poor 
and the persistence in poverty decreases.  
•  Long-term poverty, defined in absolute terms, has decreased but be-
come more concentrated to those living alone and to immigrants. 
Among immigrants, persistence is higher than among those born in 
Sweden.  
•  An individual’s incomes and risk of poverty are associated with the 
household incomes during childhood. Those who grow up poor have 
excess risks for ending up poor as adults. The probability of ending up 
as high-income earners is much higher for those who grew up under 
such advantaged conditions themselves as compared to others.  
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•  Intergenerational income mobility increased between 1995 and 2005, 
approximately, but whereas inequality of opportunity thus decreased the 
economic consequences of the income background grew.  
Introduction 
A lack of economic resources limits the scope of action of individuals and 
thereby decreases their welfare. Poverty is a central indicator of welfare also 
because small household resources correlate with other problematic condi-
tions, such as health, over-crowding, low self-esteem, and lack of participa-
tion in social and political life. Especially long-term poverty can be assumed 
to lead to social exclusion and to a decline in self-confidence and initiative. 
Poverty during childhood may affect people not only by the low living stan-
dard as a child, but may also increase the risk of poverty as adult. 
In this study, we analyze the change and prevalence of poverty, as well as 
its distribution and dynamics. We use data from the last two decades to ad-
dress a series of important questions. The first section discusses conceptual 
issues and presents several measures of poverty. The second section de-
scribes the change in incomes and poverty from the onset of the 1990s up 
until 2007. The third section is about mobility into and out of poverty, add-
ing a dynamic perspective. In the fourth and last section we study the asso-
ciation between parental poverty and children’s poverty as adults. All in all, 
we aim at answering the following questions: 
•  Has poverty increased during the last two decades in Sweden? 
•  Which groups are poor, and has this pattern changed? 
•  Has poverty duration, that is, the difficulty in leaving poverty, changed? 
•  Has the risk of re-entering poverty increased or decreased? 
•  Has long-term poverty changed, and/or become more concentrated to 
certain groups? 
•  For those who grow up in poverty, what are the risks of ending up in 
poverty? 
1. What is poverty, and who are the poor? 
Poverty is most commonly studied through incomes, as they stand for the 
lion’s share of individual’s and families’ economic resources. Furthermore, 
incomes are often the only economic resources that we can measure accu-
rately, particularly when one can profit from tax data. There is a multitude 
of alternative definitions of poverty or related phenomena. Concepts like 
economic hardship, marginalization, exclusion, and deprivation are com-
mon. The Swedish government prefers “economic vulnerable”, and earlier 
the concept “low-income-takers” was frequently used. In this chapter, we 
choose the traditional concept of “poverty”, referring to different definitions 
of income poverty and social welfare recipiency (see below on measures).  
While it is far from certain how poverty shall be defined (cf. the discus-
sions in Atkinson et al. 2002; Nolan and Whelan 2007), most definitions 
take the disposable income as a point of departure. At the same time, every- 
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one appears to agree that poverty has a relative dimension – who counts as 
poor changes over time and vary across countries (sometimes even across 
regions within a country). Other conditions determine who is considered 
poor in a welfare state such as present-day Sweden than in a developing 
country, or what would have been the case in Sweden a hundred years ago. 
A common definition is that a person is poor who, because of limited 
economic resources, is unable to live a life that is acceptable or expected in 
his/her society. It is about not being able to participate fully in social life, 
about feeling ashamed, and about lacking self-esteem as a consequence of 
economic deprivation (Townsend 1979). Such poverty can for example be-
come visible in the inability to buy new clothes to the children, to invite 
friends over for dinner, or not being able to participate in activities that cost 
money. Poverty, therefore, also has a social dimension. 
Early research on poverty used different measures of “necessary con-
sumption” to calculate at what income level a household could be regarded 
as poor (Rowntree 1901). A common method of estimating the poverty line 
is still today to put together a basket of goods and services that are regarded 
as necessary for a “decent”, or “acceptable” living standard, and calculate 
the value of this basket. This value is then adjusted according to needs by 
considering the composition and size of the household. The poverty line is 
sometimes used to investigate when the welfare state should offer different 
kinds of support, primarily social assistance (welfare benefits). A poverty 
line often used in Swedish research (Jansson 2000, Socialstyrelsen 2007), 
one that we also will use, is based on the inflation-adjusted norm for social 
assistance in 1985. This norm takes its departure in a calculation of neces-
sary costs for an acceptable level of living (cf. Table 1). Even though the 
basket needed to accomplish such a level obviously is dependent on where 
and when one lives – and in this respect is relative – we will use this poverty 
line to define absolute poverty. The measure is absolute in the sense that the 
poverty line defines the same purchasing power from one year to the next, 
and is absolute also in the sense that someone with a given purchasing pow-
er is regarded as poor no matter how many others fall below this line.  
More recent research into poverty has been critical to absolute definitions 
of poverty and instead preferred to measure relative poverty (Mack and 
Lansley 1985; Townsend 1979). The argument is that those who have an 
income much below what people in general have, in the society they live, 
should count as poor. It is the relative economic distance to others, not some 
absolute purchasing power, which determines the ability to live a life under 
the same conditions as others in society, and participate in social life like 
them. With a relative definition of poverty, the purchasing power at which 
one is considered poor can change from one year to the next. One can per-
haps say that a general growth in affluence of a population has as one con-
sequence that it becomes more expensive to maintain one’s self-esteem and 
social status; there is inflation in the amount of money needed to be on par 
with one’s likes. The absolute measure of poverty can of course be adapted 
to new ”needs”, so that the content of the basket is updated (e.g., computer 
or mobile phone). In this sense, the measure is culturally relative, but the 
content is the same for everyone and if your income is not high enough to 
afford the basket you are considered poor no matter how many others are  
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not able to do this. Those who prefer relative measures of poverty, on the 
other hand, want the relative dimension to be built into the measure. 
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Measures of poverty 
Absolute poverty 
In our analyses, those who fall below the poverty line defined according to the 
1985 social assistance norm are considered poor in an absolute sense. This norm is 
in turn based on an estimate (by Konsumentverket, an independent state bureau) of 
acceptable living standard, based on the costs for goods and services deemed ne-
cessary (such as housing, clothing, health care, TV, daily paper, telephone, insur-
ances). The calculation of this “basket” includes estimated costs for housing and 
journeys to and from work, depending on region of residence, year, and household 
composition. The poverty line thus defined (in 1985) is adjusted annually with the 
consumer price index to compensate for inflation and deflation (Jansson 2000). 
Income standard is calculated as the equivalized disposable income (see the key 
for Income measures) divided with the poverty line (taking into account residence 
and household composition). Income standard = 1 means an income just on the 
poverty line. Those with lower incomes are regarded as poor in an absolute sense. 
Those with incomes 25 per cent or more below the poverty line (i.e., 75 per cent or 
less than the income representing the poverty line), are considered extremely poor. 
Those who have incomes above the poverty line but not more than 25 per cent 
higher are considered nearly poor. 
Relative poverty 
An individual is considered poor in a relative sense of the term if their equivalized 
disposable income falls below 60 per cent of the median of the population (EU 
standard since 2003). In OECD, the limit is instead 50 per cent of the median. We 
use this measure and the limit of 40 per cent of the median to define the very poor, 
in a relative sense. The relative poverty rate reflects the income distribution and 
does not relate to any estimate of how much money is needed to reach an accepta-
ble living standard. 
Social assistance (ekonomiskt bistånd) 
Social assistance (SA) is the last resort for people with temporary economic prob-
lems. After applying for SA, an official at the municipality social office makes an 
individual assessment of the need for support. The basic principle is that someone 
who has money in the bank or other economic resources (such as a car or a house) 
does not have the right to SA. The level of support is judged according to a stan-
dard of acceptable living conditions, but extra support can be given in particular 
cases, such as for dental care. The lower limit of SA is decided by the government, 
but apart from that, the decision of eligibility and amounts of support lies with 
local municipalities. 
Lack of cash margin 
Lacking cash margin is defined as not being able to raise a given sum of money in 
a week. In the annual survey of living conditions (ULF), Statistics Sweden asks 
whether the respondent is able to get 15,000 SEK (2008; around 1,500 Euros) in a 
week, if needed (see Vogel et al. 1988). The sum is adjusted from time to time to 
adjust approximately for changes in consumer price levels. 
 
There are several often used relative measures of poverty. One 
straightforward and for many purposes practical measure is to define those 
at the bottom of the income distribution (e.g., the lowest ten per cent) as 
poor. Such a measure is also in line with the idea that it is the relative posi-
tion in the income distribution that is important for the consumption oppor- 
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tunities, especially for the cost of housing – those who are worst off are also 
those who have the worst housing conditions. 
The drawback with a simple percentage measure is that it does not take 
into account just how large income differences are. Therefore, a commonly 
used measure of relative poverty is based on income differences. According 
to this measure, those who have an income that is less than 60 per cent of 
the median income in the population are considered poor (Eurostat 2009). 
This means that rather than having a given proportion being considered 
poor, this will instead be a function of the income distribution. In fact 
(though it is rarely noted), according to this relative measure we may well 
define fewer household as poor than we would with a measure of absolute 
poverty: with a very even income distribution it can even be the case that no 
one is defined as poor (this happens, obviously, if no one has an income 
below 60 per cent of the median, so it demands only that the income differ-
ences in the lower half of the distribution are small). If this is a theoretically 
desirable feature of the measure is not easy to say. 
A more obvious drawback with the relative measures of poverty is how-
ever that comparisons between countries and change over time become dif-
ficult. With a relative definition, poverty is more wide-spread in Germany 
than in Bulgaria despite the fact that living standards are generally higher in 
Germany (Eurostat 2009). During times of rapidly growing affluence the 
somewhat strange situation can occur that the number of poor increases in 
relative terms, although the absolute poverty decreases dramatically – this is 
what has in fact happened in Ireland (Layte, Nolan, and Whelan 2001).  
Maybe this is primarily a matter of time perspective: people’s aspirations 
as well as the costs of social life no doubt increase during growth, but prob-
ably slowly. Critics have however asked whether it is reasonable that a per-
son who cannot afford food, and therefore counts as poor according to an 
absolute definition, will not be considered poor in a relative sense if a suffi-
cient number of others end up in the same precarious situation (Sen 1983). 
Another objection against a relative measure of poverty based on the income 
distribution is that it is simply another way of measuring inequality. If one 
cannot show a sharply changed importance of the position in the income 
distribution for people’s living conditions at the poverty line, it is further-
more a dubious way of measuring inequality. 
A criticism that is directed both towards the more traditional absolute and 
against the relative measure of poverty is that the definition of poverty 
should not only be based on income. Instead of measuring the precondition 
for an acceptable living standard, it is argued, we should measure poverty 
directly, as economic deprivation. It is, in other words, more correct theoret-
ically, to measure the appearances of poverty, for example, whether people 
really participate in social life, if they have sufficient clothing, if their hous-
ing situation is acceptable, or whether they are characterized by low con-
sumption (Ringen 1988). This approach is in practice, despite theoretical 
differences, quite close to the definition of the level of living in Scandina-
vian welfare state research (Johansson 1970; Erikson and Åberg 1987). Em-
pirical studies also show that many of those who have incomes below the 
poverty line are not economically deprived, and vice versa (Ringen 1988, 
Halleröd 1995; Layte, Maitre, Nolan, and Whelan 2001; Halleröd and Lars- 
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son 2008). In studies concentrating on inequality of outcomes rather than 
inequality of resources one is however confronted with the problem that 
some people deliberately have a low level of consumption, or a life-style 
reminding of poverty. In an attempt to circumvent this choice problem, 
“consensual poverty” has been introduced as a theoretical concept, followed 
by a way of measuring it empirically. Respondents to a survey answer ques-
tions about what type of consumer goods or activities they consider neces-
sary, whether they lack them, and if so whether they do so because they 
cannot afford them – those who lack things that are generally seen as neces-
sary are defined as poor (Mack and Lansley 1985). This method has appar-
ent problems too – one has to believe, for example, that people can and will 
respond to the question whether they lack things because they cannot afford 
them. Several studies use the concept of consensual poverty, and some stu-
dies also combine indicators of economic deprivation and low income to 
sharpen the identification of the poor (Halleröd 1995; Nolan and Whelan 
1996; Ringen 1988; Jonsson and Östberg 2004). 
Inevitably, the number of poor varies with the definition of poverty, 
which accentuates the fact that the measures of poverty are partly arbitrary. 
This is illustrated for relative poverty by the change, in 2003, of the EU po-
verty line from 50 per cent of the median income to 60 per cent. The abso-
lute measures of poverty are less arbitrary, even if the same issues can be 
raised over the definition of the basket defining the minimum standard of 
living, particularly for items outside of the basic needs for nutrition. 
Because the different measures reflect different dimensions of poverty, 
and because they have different pros and cons, we will use several of them. 
Apart from using income based indicators, we study the recipiency of social 
assistance (SA). The advantage of using SA as a measure of poverty is that 
it is tested for needs, meaning that those who get it with some certainty are 
poor – apart from having low income, they also lack economic possessions. 
One drawback is that far from everyone who is poor applies for SA. Esti-
mating this number is however very difficult. For Sweden, there is no exact 
information, but some estimates suggest that the proportion eligible who do 
not apply is large (Gustafsson 2002), leading to an under-estimation of the 
number of poor. Similar results are reported from a number of other coun-
tries, and it is probable that lack of information on eligibility of SA, and the 
stigma associated with it, account for this pattern (Mood 2006). Apart from 
the under-reporting problem, there is another drawback of using SA as an 
indicator of poverty: If we use a social policy instrument to calculate the 
poverty rate, politicians could in theory reduce poverty by raising the re-
quirements for eligibility of SA – thus, cutting poverty support would in fact 
lead to shrinking numbers of poor. Finally, a third drawback is that a change 
over time in the number of SA recipients may take place either because of a 
real change in the number of poor; a changing propensity of applying for SA 
among the needy; changing routines among the social workers who grant 
SA; or changing directives from the parliament.  
Despite the different theoretical underpinnings and the various pros and 
cons with different definitions of poverty, we can note, in Table 1, that the 
income limits used to define poverty according to a relative measure, an 
absolute measure, and SA, are very close to each other for a given year.  
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Table 1. Threshold values for different poverty measures 
Threshold values (income in SEK) for the absolute and relative poverty line, and for social 
assistance. Households of different composition in different types of municipalities in 2007.  
 
* 60 per cent of the median income (disposable equivalized income). 
Children below 12 are presumed to have child care at a cost corresponding to maxtaxa. 
Source: HEK, Statistics Sweden 
 
Income measures 
Mean income is the average annual income of a person or household. 
Median income is the middle income in the income distribution. The median is 
often preferred to the mean when there are extreme values in the distribution, as 
particularly very high incomes can influence the mean. 
Disposable income is the income an individual or household commands. It is 
calculated as income from employment and capital, adjusted for taxes and deduc-
tions, and adding monetary transfers and benefits. 
Equivalized disposable income, or disposable income per consumption unit, ad-
justs the disposable income according to need, as estimated according to the size 
and composition of the household. Each household member gets a weight corres-
ponding to their assumed needs and these weights are summed up. The equivalized 
disposable income is calculated as the total disposable income divided by this total 
household weight. The weights used in Statistics Sweden’s study of the economy 
of households (HEK), which we base our first section on, are as follows: 
•  1      – one adult 
•  1,51 – two adults 
•  0,52 – the first child in the household  
•  0,42 – each of the other children 
•  0,60 – children older than 19 and other adults in the household. 
In the section Poverty dynamics, building on register data, we use another equi-
valence scale based on one made by Statistics Sweden for register-based studies 
(Statistics Sweden 2009a), with the following weights: 
•  1      – one adult 
•  1,66 – two adults 
•  0,48 – child 0–3 years of age 
•  0,57 – child 4–10  
•  0,66 – child 11–17 
•  0,83 – an additional adult (18+) 


































                 
Living alone  9 575  8 331  8 243  8 158  8 071  7 938  7 850  7 634  7 546 
Cohabiting or married 
With no children in household  14 459  12 969  12 637  12 673  12 341  12 508  12 176  12 194  11 862 
1 child: 3 year old  19 438  17 079  16 425  16 758  16 105  16 542  15 889  16 182  15 528 
2 children: 3 and 5 years  23 460  20 135  19 424  19 815  19 104  19 599  18 888  19 238  18 527 
3 children: 2, 4, and 12   27 482  23 877  23 422  23 602  23 147  23 412  22 957  22 889  22 435 
Lone parent 
1 child: 3 year  old  14 555  12 238  12 637  11 942  12 341  11 777  12 176  11 462  11 862 
2 children: 3 and 5  18 576  16 683  16 165  16 362  15 845  16 146  15 629  15 786  15 268 
3 children: 2, 4, and 12  22 598  19 235  18 984  18 915  18 664  18 699  18 448  18 338  18 087 
Great Stockholm  Great Gothenburg Other municipalities  






Real income. In order to make annual incomes comparable over time, they have 
been adjusted according to the price level of 2007 using Statistics Sweden’s con-
sumer price index. 
Irreliability in income data. The income data, in our case gathered via the tax 
registers, come with errors. One reason is that non-declared incomes are not in-
cluded, which may lead to a slight over-estimation of poverty rates. Another reason 
is that in register data, it is not always possible to correctly identify households, as 
we cannot identify non-married cohabitants without common children. This mostly 
affects households consisting of young childless partners, where the number of 
singles becomes over-estimated. It also overestimates the number of lone parents as 
an unmarried parent with no common child with their partner will be classified as a 
lone parent (cf. Statistics Sweden 2003). We have tested for the consequences this 
irreliability, and our conclusion is that our main results are not affected. 
Measures of income differences 
Gini-coefficient. A statistical measure of income dispersion, and the most common 
indicator of income inequality. The value 0 means that incomes are equally distri-
buted (everyone has the same income) and the value 1 that inequality is maximized 
(one person has all the incomes). The value reflects the average income difference 
between two randomly chosen individuals in a population divided by the mean 
income in that population. 
Percentile quotients (95/5 and 90/10, respectively). A simpler measure of in-
come dispersion showing the contrast between those with high and low incomes, 
respectively. To construct this measure, the population is divided into 100 equal-
sized groups (percentile groups). Those with the lowest incomes are in percentile 
group 1, those with the next lowest in group 2 and so on up to percentile group 100 
which consists of the percentage of the population with the highest incomes. Per-
centiles are the values that represent the borders between these groups – the first 
percentile separates the lowest percentile group from the second lowest, and so on. 
The percentile quotient is defined as the income that identifies those with the high-
er incomes (percentiles 95 and 90, respectively) divided with the income that iden-
tifies those with the lower incomes (percentiles 5 and 10, respectively). In the fig-
ures, we entitle the fifth percentile P05, and so on. 
 
2. The change in and distribution of income and 
poverty, 1991—2007 
Has poverty increased or decreased during the last decades in Sweden? Who 
are poor today? In this section, which builds on the discussion of poverty 
measures above, we study the change and distribution of income and pover-
ty 1991-2007. This was a turbulent period economically with 1991 as the 
last year of a rather extreme economic growth, followed by one of the deep-
est recessions in Sweden’s modern history –  around 1992—1997, after 
which there was an irregular but sustained improvement up until 2007. We 
also cover a turbulent period when it comes to migration, with a drastically 
increased immigration, in particular of ex-Yugoslavian and non-European 
groups, coupled with quite high return-migration rates as well.  
In this section, we identify groups that are at risk of poverty, make com-
parisons over time, and make an international comparison of relative pover- 
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ty. Unless otherwise stated, the analyses are based on data from Statistics 
Sweden’s study of the economy of households (HEK, see Statistics Sweden 
2009b). All incomes are adjusted to the 2007 years price levels. 
Increased real incomes – and growing income differences 
In order to understand the change in poverty rates, it is important to know 
the changes in both average incomes and the variance in income. Figure 1 
shows the development of these two measures (without taking capital in-
come into account).
 1
We can also note, in Figure 1, that the spread in income increased. This is 
evident from the fanning out of the curves showing incomes at different 
percentiles. Almost all income strata have experienced a favourable devel-
opment of their real disposable annual incomes during the period, but high-
income earners have increased their incomes the most. 
 The starting year in this analysis (as in other analyses 
in this section) is 1991. This is partly because of data comparability, partly 
because we then cover the macro-economic shift described above. This shift 
is in fact reflected in the average and median incomes, showing a decrease 
in real incomes up until 1995 and a rapid increase after that – during this 
latter period of economic growth real incomes grew with no less than 59 per 
cent. 
 
Figure 1. Income development 1991–2007 
Average income, median income, and income at different percentiles.* Equivalized disposi-
ble income, excluding income from capital, in 2007 price level. SEK (Euro*10) 
 
 
* Percentiles.E.g., P05 defines the income for the 5% lowest incomes, and P95 for the 5% highest. 
Values for 1992 are interpolated 
Source: HEK, Statistics Sweden 
                                                 
 
1 Capital income generates money that can be used for consumption. However, capital 
incomes are sensitive for changes in tax regulations. In 2001, for example, a change in the 
taxation of profit from selling condos made many realize these profits in 2000 with a con-























The equivalized disposable incomes at the fifth percentile (representing 
the incomes of the economically most vulnerable) have increased from 
around 75k SEK during the 1990s to around 90k SEK in 2006-2007. At the 
95
th percentile, however (i.e., among those with the highest incomes) the 
growth has been dramatic from a good 250k to 380k. Households at all in-
come levels (also those not shown in Figure 1) have witnessed increased 
real disposable incomes, and thus become richer, but the richest have be-
come much richer. 
The increasing income disparities are obvious when we study direct 
measures of income spread in Figure 2. To avoid registering sudden changes 
in taxation, we show incomes both with and without capital incomes. Either 
way, the message is that of growing income differences. With the previous 
analysis in mind, we deduce that this is because income growth was greatest 
for high-income earners. In fact, the Gini coefficient (including capital in-
come) increased from around 0.22 in 1991 to around 0.30 in 2007, which is 
a remarkable change. Also excluding capital income, the change is noticea-
ble, from 0.20 to 0.25. Nevertheless, compared to other countries, Sweden 
has a relatively even income distribution (excluding capital incomes), far off 
the high marks of Great Britain, Portugal, Italy, and Germany (Figure 3) – 
though Sweden does follow an international trend towards growing income 
disparities (OECD 2008). 
 
Figure 2. Income inequality in Sweden 1991–2007 
Percentile quotient* P95/P05 and P90/P10; Gini-coefficient, with and without capital incomes 
 
 
* The quotient between incomes at different percentiles in the income distribution. 
Values for 1992 are interpolated. 























1991  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  2007 
P95/P05, incl. capital income  P95/P05, exkl. capital income 
P90/P10, incl. capital income  P90/P10, exkl. capital income 
Gini -  coefficient, incl. capital income  Gini -  koefficient, exkl. capital income 
 





Figure 3. Income inequality in an international perspective in 2007 




* The data come from country-specific studies, adjusted with OECDs modified equivalence scale: 1,0 for the first adult 
person in the household, 0,5 for other persons aged 14 and older, and 0,3 for children 0–13. 
Note that other equivalence scales are used in other analyses in this chapter. 
Source: Eurostat (2009).  
The change and distribution of poverty  
Increasing relative poverty – and decreasing absolute poverty 
In times of growing income dispersion, the number of relatively poor typi-
cally increases, as that measure is based on income differences. The propor-
tion of relatively poor did also increase markedly during the period under 
study. Using the EU standard definition of poverty (the poor having in-
comes less than 60 per cent of the median), the poverty rate increased from 
a good 5 per cent in 1994 to more than 12 per cent in 2007, with a particu-
larly rapid increase during the most recent years (Figure 4). Using even 
lower incomes (50 and 40 per cent of the median) to define the very poor, 
the development shows a similar increasing trend, though not with the same 
speed in absolute terms.  





























Gini -  coefficient  
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Figure 4. Poverty 1991–2007 according to different measures 
The proportion with incomes* below the relative and absolute poverty line, respectively, and 
the proportion in households with social assistance some time during the year, both of the 
whole population. The proportion aged 16-84 without cash margin. Per cent  
 
* Equivalized disposable income. 
Values for 1992 are interpolated.  
The curve for cash margin collapses two adjacent years and is based on moving averages. 
Source: HEK and ULF (cash margin), Statistics Sweden. 
 
Neither increased income dispersion, nor a growing proportion of rela-
tively poor, tells us anything about the development of absolute poverty. 
There are several reasons for this, notably that the absolute rate of poverty is 
closer connected with purchasing power than with income dispersion. Inte-
restingly enough, but not altogether surprisingly, the development of abso-
lute poverty shows a marked decrease (Figure 4). The proportion in abso-
lute poverty (i.e., with an income below the absolute poverty line) increased 
substantially during the economic recession in the 1990s, but has since then 
decreased steadily. In fact, this type of poverty was halved between 1996 
and 2007.
2
                                                 
 
2 Some studies use “anchored poverty”, which takes its starting point in relative poverty a 
given year, but then holds constant for purchasing power (i.e., using an absolute definition 
in practice). The trends in absolute poverty in Figure 4 are very similar to the ones based on 













1991  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  05  06  2007 
Per cent 
<40% of median income  <0,75 of abs. poverty line 
<50% of median income  <1,00 of abs. poverty line 
<60% of median inc (rel. poverty line)  In household with social assistance 
Lacking cash margin  
 
15 
The reception of welfare benefits describes a similar development, mainly 
because SA eligibility depends more on the absolute than the relative in-
come – the proportion on SA shrunk from 9 per cent in 1996 to a good 4 per 
cent in 2007. The group extremely poor (income below 75 per cent of the 
poverty line) also diminished in size, but at an appreciably slower rate.  
Figure 4 shows also another indicator of poverty, the lack of cash margin. 
This is a more immediate measure of economic problems or vulnerability 
that may stem from too low income in relation to needs, or from too large 
expenses in relation to income (for example, by high mortgages). The relev-
ance of the measure is high because it is important in everyday life to meet a 
sudden economic need (e.g., for changing a defect washing machine, or re-
pairing the car). In difference to the income-based measures of poverty (but 
just like SA), the cash margin depends on the total economic situation, for 
example also on savings and other economic resources. It is an interesting 
complement to the other measures because it lies closer to the definition of 
economic deprivation in being a more direct indicator of poverty. It is en-
tirely possible that the reduction of absolute poverty over time was counte-
racted by a raising consumption level following growing real incomes. At 
the core of the view of poverty as a relative phenomenon lies the assumption 
that  the “acceptable” living standard increases with generally  increasing 
disposable incomes, because the surplus is used for “keeping up with the 
Joneses”. If this is true, we can imagine that the access to cash margin does 
not respond to general economic growth or contraction. This is not the case, 
however: the proportion lacking cash margin, as defined here, follows the 
change in absolute poverty closely. While it is greater than the proportion on 
SA, these two indicators change almost exactly at the same pace over time. 
  
Figure 5. Poor and rich 1991–2007 
The proportion of people living in households with different income standards in relation to 
the absolute poverty line. Disposable equivalized income. Whole population. Per cent. 
 
 
Values for 1992 are interpolated. 












1991  93  95  97  99  01  03  05  2007 
Rich  
(>4) 
Well off                 
(2  - 4) 
Normal income                      
(1,25  –  2) 
Nearly poor                       
(1,00   –  1,25) 
Poor               
(0,75   –  1,00) 
Extremely poor      
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In Figure 5 we can see the change in absolute poverty in perspective of 
the total distribution of absolute income. At the same time as poverty de-
clined, the group of “well off” – having at least twice as high income as the 
absolute poverty line – increased markedly, and comprised in 2007 more 
than half of the population.  
From a poverty perspective, it is important to note that not only did the 
poor group decrease in size, but also those near the poverty line (up to 25 
per cent higher). In 1996-97, when absolute poverty peaked, the nearly poor 
comprised almost 20 per cent of the population, while in 2007 they were 
below 7 per cent. In 1991, at the onset of the recession, the poor and ex-
tremely poor constituted almost the same share of the population as in 2007, 
but the nearly poor were twice as many (not shown in Figure 5). Thus, the 
development during the first decade of the new millennium was especially 
positive because it removed many people from the forecourts of poverty. 
Change in the distribution of poverty 
The fact that the proportion of people under the absolute poverty line has 
been halved from the end of the 1990s is of course not the same thing as 
saying that poverty is no longer a problem. While the scope of the problem 
has evidently decreased, poverty can be even harder to endure for those who 
are poor in good times, and if poverty gets more concentrated to some 
groups in the population the relevance for fighting it increases. An impor-
tant question is therefore who are poor at given points in time. In the follow-
ing section we study the change in absolute poverty in different population 
groups. We give an account of the average poverty rates across three longer 
periods, 1993—1998, 1999—2002, and 2003—2007, where the first period 
represents the economic recession, the second a recovery phase, and the 
third a new “normal” situation (Table 2). 
We should note that poverty is always based on the total household in-
come (see the description of the measures) and therefore everyone in the 
same household has the same income situation per definition. In households 
with one man and one woman (married or cohabiting) there can be no sex 
differences in poverty, as defined here. The assumption that everyone in the 
same household has the same income is of course a strong one, and proba-
bly contributes to underestimating the poverty among women (and perhaps 
children). Calculating the actual access to economic resources at the indi-
vidual level is not possible with our data, however, and hardly with any 
available data (Burton, Phipps, and Woolley 2007). 
Generally, in Table 2, we register the same differences between popula-
tion groups, and the same change over time, for poor or nearly poor alike. 
The development for the extremely poor in the different groups is by and 
large the same too, with some deviations. We can conclude, in line with 
earlier research (e.g., Socialstyrelsen 2006; Gustafsson, Zaidi, and Franzén 
2007), that children, youth, young adults, students, lone mothers, and immi-
grants have higher poverty risks than other groups. Among the foreign-born, 
newly arrived immigrants have particularly high risks of ending up in pover-
ty.  This also goes for non-European immigrants, mainly because these 
groups belong to those who arrived more recently.   
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Table 2. Absolute poverty in different categories, 1993–2007 
Poverty rates among the poor; the poor including the nearly poor; and among the extremely 
poor. Proportion with incomes* below the absolute poverty line. Averages for the periods 
1993–1998, 1999–2002, and 2003–2007. Whole population. 
 
 
* Equivalized disposible income. 
** Incl. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. 
Source: HEK, Statistics Sweden. 
 
Population category  Income in relation to the absolute poverty line 
Extremely poor  Poor  Poor and nearly poor  



















%  %  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
All  2,5  2,4  1,9  9,4  7,3  5,5  27,3  19,7  14,1 
Women  2,4  2,5  1,8  9,7  7,8  5,5  29,5  22,1  15,4 
Men  2,5  2,4  2,0  9,0  6,8  5,5  25,1  17,2  12,8 
Born in Sweden  (aged 20+)  1,8  1,8  1,4  6,3  5,0  3,7  21,4  15,3  10,5 
Foreign-born  (20+)  4,3  4,2  3,9  17,7  14,3  12,1  40,4  31,7  27,1 
Years since immigration 
 0– 5 years  7,4  6,6  9,1  39,5  29,9  28,1  74,2  55,0  49,4 
 6–10  7,3  6,2  6,0  21,8  25,4  20,2  54,8  47,6  41,5 
11–20  5,8  5,1  4,3  19,2  14,1  12,0  41,0  35,9  31,7 
21+  1,7  2,6  1,7  7,0  6,5  5,3  22,1  18,2  14,3 
Birth region 
Nordic  2,5  2,7  2,5  7,2  6,4  4,9  22,8  17,5  12,7 
Western Europe**  3,6  2,6  3,5  9,6  7,0  8,6  23,1  19,2  16,1 
Northeast Europe  2,4  4,4  3,0  10,7  8,2  9,5  31,7  22,2  21,3 
Southeast Europe  3,1  3,7  1,9  25,0  18,7  10,1  54,5  39,7  27,6 
Middle East/North Africa  10,8  8,0  6,8  39,6  30,6  23,2  74,6  57,5  49,5 
Africa, other  5,0  3,6  3,4  33,4  23,5  19,9  72,9  48,0  38,7 
Asia, other  6,6  6,6  6,2  28,3  17,3  16,9  54,1  36,9  33,3 
Latin America  4,5  4,0  5,0  20,6  11,9  11,2  53,9  33,5  28,0 
Household type (20+) 
Women, living alone  3,6  3,1  2,8  12,1  10,9  7,9  42,0  35,8  25,4 
Men, living alone  5,0  4,4  4,3  11,2  9,5  9,4  27,8  22,1  19,2 
M/W living with partner 
No children in household  0,7  0,6  0,5  2,7  2,2  1,7  10,5  7,3  4,8 
Common children, 0–18 years,  
in household  1,9  1,4  1,4  8,8  6,7  4,6  26,8  15,7  10,4 
Children 0–18, in household,  
none common  1,4  0,8  1,5  5,9  3,1  3,6  13,4  8,5  8,3 
Single, children 0–18  
Women  4,3  3,7  2,7  21,6  14,7  10,5  62,1  51,4  38,3 
Men  3,8  2,8  2,4  16,2  9,7  6,5  45,8  26,6  18,0 
Socio-economic class (20–64) 
Workers  0,7  0,9  0,6  3,7  3,0  2,1  16,2  10,8  7,0 
Higher official/professional  0,2  0,3  0,2  1,2  0,8  0,5  5,2  2,3  1,8 
Labour market status (20–64) 
Gainfully employed  1,5  1,5  1,0  4,5  3,4  2,4  14,4  8,9  6,1 
Student  8,6  7,6  9,2  26,0  21,9  23,3  55,2  46,3  45,0 
Unemployed/sick/early retired  2,0  1,6  1,5  8,8  5,7  5,9  27,6  19,2  18,2 
Age-group 
0–19  3,5  3,6  2,5  14,5  10,9  7,6  38,8  26,8  18,3 
20–24  7,9  6,7  7,0  19,1  16,3  16,1  38,0  32,8  31,7 
25–44  2,3  2,6  2,2  9,0  7,1  5,7  26,6  17,5  13,1 
45–64  1,4  1,3  1,0  4,2  3,2  2,7  11,2  8,1  7,0 
65–74  0,5  0,7  0,5  3,6  3,8  1,9  18,6  15,8  8,1 
75+  0,8  1,0  0,4  9,8  8,2  4,3  46,1  36,5  21,9  
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The fact that some groups have a higher risk of poverty than others is of 
course no surprise. The more incomes in a household, and the fewer that 
have to share that income, the smaller is the poverty risk. We thus expect 
that households with two adults but no children have low poverty risks and 
lone parents have high. Poverty risks are also about having gainful employ-
ment – those who lack incomes due to sickness, studies, or unemployment 
(particularly before entering the labour market) have higher poverty rates. 
This is also expected, because the economic support and contributions from 
the social insurance system, and from study loans, are substantially smaller 
than incomes from employment. At the same time as it is natural in a labour 
market such as Sweden’s (with high-level low incomes) that those with jobs 
are to a large extent safe-guarded against poverty, it raises the question why 
some groups – notably foreign-born – more often than others lack gainful 
employment.  
It should be noted that absolute poverty is not especially high among the 
oldest group. The Swedish pension system has complete coverage  and 
pension levels are high for a large majority, so, in difference to many other 
countries, relatively few pensioners are poor (e.g., Palme 1990; Gustafsson, 
Johansson, and Palmer 2009). 
The increasing economic living standard following the recession in the 
mid-1990s is primarily a consequence of increasing incomes from gainful 
employment, partly because more people have jobs. There is no guarantee 
that the income levels of social benefits and study loans follow the econom-
ic growth (because these are political decisions), and Table 2 also demon-
strates that groups who have their economic support from other sources than 
gainful employment have lagged behind during the later time period under 
study. 
How, then, has the distribution of poverty risks changed? The answer is 
that there has been an equalization of absolute poverty – as poverty has de-
creased generally, it has done so more for the more exposed groups. The 
improvement has been particularly noteworthy in some categories characte-
rized by high poverty rates during the recession (1993-98), such as foreign-
born and lone parents. Categories that have not followed the positive trend 
are young adults and non-employed for whom the poverty risks remain at a 
high level also during the last period.
3
We have to remember that the first time period reflects an extremely deep 
recession and it is therefore not surprising that the income increases follow-
ing the economic growth in the more recent periods are higher for those who 
started off at very low levels. When we instead compare the situation in 
2007 with that of 1991 – at the onset of the recession – poverty risks have 
clearly been equalized between different household types, whereas the dif-





                                                 
 
3 A closer investigation of the high poverty rates among young adults in 2003-2007 reveals 
that it is primarily due to high poverty risks among male students (not shown).  
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Table 3. Relative poverty, 1993–2007 
Proportion with incomes* below the relative poverty line (60% of the median income). Aver-
ages for the periods 1993–1998, 1999–2002 och 2003–2007. Whole population.  
* Equivalized disposible income. 
** Incl. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA. 
Source: HEK, Statistics Sweden. 
Population group  Relative poverty 
Income below 60% of median income 
1993– 1998  1999– 2002  2003– 2007 
%  %  % 
All  6,6  8,9  9,1 
Women  6,7  9,6  9,6 
Men  6,4  8,1  8,6 
Born in Sweden  (20+ years of age)  4,5  6,4  7,3 
Foreign-born  (20+)  12,5  17,6  20,6 
Years since immigration 
 0– 5 years  28,3  38,0  43,1 
 6–10  17,5  30,3  33,8 
11–20  12,9  16,9  21,9 
21+  4,4  8,2  10,0 
Birth region 
Nordic  4,7  8,1  8,9 
Western Europe**  7,2  9,4  13,1 
North East Europe  7,1  9,6  13,9 
South East Europe  16,1  25,2  19,7 
Middle East/North Africa  31,0  35,7  38,8 
Africa, other  20,1  29,6  30,4 
Asia, other  19,4  20,2  28,5 
Latin America  14,2  13,0  20,8 
Household type (20+) 
Women, living alone  8,9  15,7  14,4 
Men, living alone  9,0  11,9  13,1 
W/M living with partner 
No children in household  1,6  2,6  2,4 
Common children, 0–18 years,  
in household  6,3  7,4  7,6 
Children 0–18, in household,  
,   none common  3,8  3,0  5,3 
Single, children 0–18 
Women  13,4  18,5  22,4 
Men  9,9  10,9  10,9 
Socio-economic class (20–64) 
Workers  2,4  3,4  3,8 
Higher official/professional  0,7  0,8  0,9 
Labour market status (20–64) 
Gainfully employed  3,2  3,7  3,6 
Student  19,4  25,9  33,7 
Unemployed/sick/early retired  5,7  7,9  10,7 
Age-group 
0–19  10,2  12,5  12,8 
20–24  15,3  18,6  22,3 
25–44   6,4  8,1  10,0 
45–64   2,8  3,7  4,9 
65–74   2,2  6,0  3,7 
75+   6,0  13,2  10,6  
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The same categories that have high incidence of absolute poverty also have 
higher risks of relative poverty – that is, primarily newly arrived immigrants 
and lone mothers (Table 3). As pointed out above, relative poverty rates 
increased during the period under study. The difference between categories 
has also grown, and the poorest groups have fallen even further behind. 
Whereas 12 per cent of lone mothers were poor in relative terms in 1991, 
this was true for no less than 28 per cent in 2007 (single years cannot be 
discerned in the table). Among newly arrived immigrants the proportion of 
relatively poor doubled during the period, from 25 to 50 per cent. The high 
levels demonstrate that these groups to a large extent have incomes that are 
substantially lower than those of others in the population. 
An international comparison 
Despite the increase since 1991, the proportion in relative poverty is low in 
Sweden in an international perspective (Figure 6). Sweden is in fact among 
the countries with the most equal distribution of income. Within EU, on 
average 16-17 per cent of the population fall below the relative poverty line. 
In many countries outside of the EU the relative poverty rate is as high as 25 
per cent of the population, for example in the USA, Turkey, and Mexico 
(data from the mid-2000s; see OECD 2008). For Sweden, the figure esti-
mated by OECD is 11 per cent.  
An important reason for the low rate in Sweden is that transfers such as 
child allowances, welfare benefits, and housing allowances have a strong 
equalizing effect. This can be seen when comparing the bars in Figure 6. 
The difference between the proportions relatively poor calculated with and 
without transfers (but discounting pensions) reflects the monetary effects of 
welfare state redistribution on poverty. Not surprising, Sweden and other 
Nordic countries display large redistributive effects (OECD 2008, Esping-
Andersen 1990), even if these decreased somewhat from the mid-1990s to 
2004 (OECD 2008).  
The welfare state has an impact on poverty not only via economic trans-
fers (benefits-in-cash) but also through services provided for free or heavily 
subsidized through taxation (benefits-in-kind). In Sweden, these services are 
predominantly in the form of care for children and elderly, education, and 
health services. Estimating the redistributive effects of such services is 
complicated, but the studies that have attempted to do so have concluded 
that such welfare state provisions further contributes to equalizing economic 
resources. In an international perspective, taking the redistributive effects of 
benefits-in-kind into account further emphasizes that the Nordic countries 
are among the most equal OECD-countries (OECD 2008). To what extent 
this reduces poverty is unclear, even if the welfare state of course cushions 
some of the negative consequences of poverty. For example, poor families 
with children in Sweden can afford to use the health care, and can utilize 
higher education which is free of direct costs.
4
                                                 
 
4 Estimates from OECD [2008, Figure 9:7], suggest that the decrease in income inequality 
(as measured by the Gini-coefficient) by benefits-in-cash in Sweden is around twice that of 
benefits-in-kind. 
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Figure 6. Relative poverty in an international perspective, 2007 
The proportion with incomes below 60 per cent of the median income (relative poverty line) 
in each country, before and after transfers. EU member states (EU27) plus Norway, Iceland 
and Croatia (candidate member 2009). Equivalized disposible income.* Per cent. 
 
 
* The data come from country-specific studies, adjusted with OECDs modified equivalence scale: 1,0 for the first adult 
person in the household, 0,5 for other persons aged 14 and older, and 0,3 for children 0–13. 
Note that other equivalence scales are used in other analyses in this chapter. 
Source: Eurostat 2009.  
Concluding discussion  
Has poverty increased or decreased in Sweden since the beginning of the 
1990s? The answer to that question depends entirely on the definition of 
poverty. It is clear that fewer Swedes are poor in an absolute sense of the 
term, fewer receive social assistance, and more claim that they have a cash 
margin. At the same time, more people have incomes below those in the 
middle of the income distribution, and the income distance between high- 
and low-income earners have grown substantially. The recovery after the 
deep recession at the beginning of and in the mid-1990s is real: on average, 
people now have a better economic situation. The increasing income spread 
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may have negative consequences for those with average and low incomes, 
but when we concentrate, as we do, on the economically vulnerable, we 
have to conclude that the development from the 1990s to 2007 has been 
characterized by decreasing poverty. 
Poverty risks are unevenly distributed in the population. Those with gain-
ful employment are rarely poor, neither in an absolute nor in a relative sense 
of the term. Categories in which many are unemployed or do not yet have a 
footing in the labour market, on the other hand, have high proportions of 
poor. This concerns students, as well as recent and non-European immi-
grants. Pensioners do however not run great risks for being poor in Sweden, 
unlike in many other countries. The differences between groups have gener-
ally decreased in terms of absolute poverty, due to increased real incomes. 
In terms of relative poverty, the differences have instead increased due to 
growing income dispersion. 
In total, the picture of the change in poverty in Sweden is contradictory. 
The judgment of the development depends on the weight we want to give to 
the absolute poverty definition as opposed to the relative. This, in turn, is a 
valuation which is difficult to make. It appears that the warnings often 
raised in Sweden for increasing poverty and poverty gaps are too focused on 
a view of poverty as predominantly a relative phenomenon. It is easy to 
overlook the importance that the growth of real disposable incomes has had 
for lifting people out of poverty during the last decade. What consequences 
the downturn in the economy that started with the international recession in 
2008 will have for poverty rates are still too early to say, but remains an 
important task for future studies in income distribution and poverty. 
3. Poverty dynamics 1991-2007 
With cross-sectional data we are able to show poverty estimates at given 
points in time and with many time points we able to analyze poverty trends, 
just like we did in the previous section. With cross-sectional data we are 
however not able to analyze poverty dynamics, that is, analyses that follow 
individual income and poverty trajectories over time. One of our main ques-
tions in this section concerns long-term, or persistent, poverty. Such “stick-
iness” may be particularly problematic because the negative consequences 
of poverty for an individual can be assumed to increase over time, and be-
cause poverty may get more difficult to escape the longer one has expe-
rienced it. This, in turn, may be because employers hesitate to hire those 
who have been out of the labour market for a long time, or because long-
term poverty makes people lose their energy and ability to change their situ-
ation. The dynamic study of poverty allows us to distinguish not only be-
tween transient and persistent poverty, but also to study repeated poverty. 
Just as long-term poverty, the risk of falling back into poverty once out of it 
is an important indicator of economic vulnerability. 
One of the first analyses of poverty over the life-course found a surpri-
singly high volatility into and out of poverty (Duncan 1984), but Ellwood 
and Bane (1986) showed this to be an incomplete characterization: The 
long-term poor are a small proportion of all those who are ever poor, but 
they remain a very high proportion of all who are poor at a given point in  
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time. They compare this with the situation in a hospital: Most of those who 
ever come to the hospital are there only briefly, but a small group stays at 
the hospital for a long time. At a given point in time, many of the hospital’s 
beds will be occupied by long-term ill, because only a few of those who 
ever are briefly ill will be at the hospital at that moment. The long-term ill 
(or the long-term poor) have a higher probability of being observed at any 
point in time, because their episode at the hospital (or in poverty) extends 
over many time-points, while those briefly ill can only be observed at one or 
a few time-points. It is also important to consider relapses into poverty: Huff 
Stevens (1999) found that half of those who exited poverty had fallen back 
within four years. 
The studies referred to above are based on American data. International 
comparisons  do however imply that some conditions are similar across 
countries (OECD 2001, Whelan et al. 2000). Duncan et al. (1993) show that 
in European countries, many people leave poverty from one year to another 
(25–40 per cent, in Sweden 37 per cent), while exit from poverty is much 
slower in the US. Oxley, Antolín, and Dang (2000) followed individual in-
come trajectories over six years, and found that between 1 per cent (Swe-
den) and 6 per cent (US) of the population had been poor for all the six 
years, and the expected poverty spell for those entering poverty was be-
tween 1.6 and 2 years in both countries (Swedish data from 1991-1996). 
A big step forward in Swedish research on poverty dynamics was Fritzell 
and Henz (2001) study based on 18 years’ data from the Swedish Level of 
Living Survey (1974-1991). One conclusion was that exit from poverty was 
on average rather quick: After 8 years, 90 per cent had left the lowest decile 
group (the tenth of the population with lowest incomes) whose average in-
come was around 70 per cent of the median income. Family events – such as 
divorce or a change in the number of children in the household – were im-
portant for women’s entries to and exits from the low income group, and 
labour market events were important for both men and women. For a later 
time period and using another definition of poverty, Oxley et al. (2000) 
found that labour market events were more important than family events for 
poverty transitions in Sweden.  
Below, we analyze duration and relapse patterns, and investigate the pro-
portion in long-term poverty. We study these patterns in general, but also 
ask whether certain groups have higher risks of long-term poverty, and 
whether these risks have changed over time. Duration of and transitions into 
and out of poverty are studied from two perspectives: absolute poverty (de-
fined above) and Social Assistance (SA).  
To study poverty in a dynamic perspective, and also over historical time 
and across groups, raise extreme demands on the data material, because it 
must be large, longitudinal, and cover many consecutive years. Because of 
attrition and small sample sizes, it can hardly be done using existing survey 
data. We therefore turn to register data covering the entire Swedish popula-
tion during the period 1990-2007. We use annual individual level data from 
the STAR database, created by Statistics Sweden for a research group at the 
Swedish Institute for Social Research and the Demography Unit at Stock-
holm University. The data base contains de-identified individual-level data 
from the censuses (FoB), tax registers (IoT), and other administrative data  
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(e.g., RTB, LISA). For the analyses here, we exclude self-employed as their 
registered incomes are not always good indicators of their actual living 
standard (Engström and Holmlund 2009).  
Poverty is defined based on calendar year household incomes, which 
means that we may miss poverty episodes that are short (if the incomes the 
rest of the year are high enough to bring the annual income above the pover-
ty line), and we do not know the exact length of spells. For immigrants, the 
poverty line during the first calendar year in Sweden is defined by dividing 
the annual income poverty line by 12 and multiplying it by the number of 
months of residence in Sweden. All analyses are made on persons 16 years 
and older, excluding those who does not live in own households (in practice, 
most 16-19-year-olds live with their parents). 
As discussed in the previous section, the different poverty measures have 
their strengths and weaknesses. In the dynamic analyses we have chosen to 
use (1) the absolute poverty measure that defines a constant purchasing 
power over time, and (2) a variable measuring whether the individual was in 
a SA-receiving household the year in question. In the first case, individuals 
are defined as poor if their annual income falls below the absolute poverty 
line. One-year spells out of poverty are not considered in the analyses if 
income during that year is below 110 per cent of the poverty line. We find 
the relative measures less suitable for dynamic analysis, as people may enter 
poverty if others’ incomes increase even though their own purchasing power 
remains constant (or even increase), and they may remain in poverty even 
though their real incomes increase substantially, if only others’ real incomes 
increase even more.  
Outflow from absolute poverty 
First, we show the proportion that remains in poverty a certain number of 
years after the start of a poverty spell. If someone who exits poverty falls 
below the poverty line again, the second episode is counted as a new epi-
sode with a new start-year (the analysis is thus based on poverty episodes, 
not individuals). Figure 7 shows the outflow from poverty during the period 
1991–2007, where each curve represents an inflow cohort, i.e., those who 
share a common start-year in poverty. For the sake of clarity, we show only 
every second inflow year. The 1991 inflow cohort can be studied for 17 
years, and later inflow cohorts can be studied over shorter periods of time, 
so the curves are of different lengths. 
Figure 7 demonstrates that on average, outflow from poverty is swift: 
Around half of all spells end within a calendar year. After four years, 15 to 
25 per cent remain in poverty, and after ten years only around 5 per cent 
remain. The curves reveal similar patterns, but at different levels. Those 
who entered poverty in 1991 remained poor much longer than those who 
entered poverty 1997-2005. After five years, the poverty of those who en-
tered poverty in 1991 was 22 per cent, while it was only 12 per cent among 
those who entered poverty in 1997-2001. Those with start years 1993-1995 
lie in between. Unsurprisingly, it appears that the duration of poverty is as-
sociated with the economic cycles: People tend to remain in poverty longer 
if the poverty spell occurs during a recession.   
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Figure 7. Outflow from absolute poverty 
Proportion of inflow cohorts that remain in uninterrupted poverty by years since inflow. Co-
horts with inflow years 1991 to 2005, every second year.  
 
Poverty histories and episodes 
Above, we study poverty durations among all who have entered poverty. 
Another option is to study the distribution of poverty durations among those 
who are poor at a given point in time. The most common approach is to 
measure how long the poor have been poor – the poverty history looking 
back in time from a given year. This measure is easy to understand and is in 
itself correct. However, it can be misleading, as many of those who are poor 
and have a poverty history of a certain number of years will continue in po-
verty (Bane and Ellwood 1986). An alternative measure is poverty episodes, 
which sums concluded episodes of poverty from the beginning to the end. 
These are rarely possible to estimate as they require long-term individual 
level panel data. Because we have such data for the years 1990–2007, we 
can study poverty episodes as well as poverty histories for the period 1994-
2003. We contrast short-term poverty (which we define as spells spanning 
no more than one calendar year) with long-term poverty (spells spanning at 
least five calendar years).
5
The choice of definition of long-term poverty makes a great difference to 
the conclusions. In 1994, 20 per cent of the poor had been poor at least five 
years (poverty history), but 47 per cent of the poor was in a spell of five 
years or more (poverty episode). Similarly, 42 per cent of the poor had a 
short-term poverty history but only 16 per cent were in a short-term episode. 
The difference occurs because many of those with a one-year history of po-
verty will continue in poverty one or more years after the observation year. 
These results show that it is not straightforward to summarize poverty dy-
namics, because the conclusions depend strongly on the chosen definition. 
  
                                                 
 
5 We start in 1994 because our first income data come from 1990, so 1994 is the first year 














































Figure 8. Short- and long-term absolute poverty 
The proportion short-term (1 year) and long-term (5 years+) poor among people in absolute 
poverty. Poverty history (1994–2007) and poverty episodes (1994–2003).  
 
 
When focusing on poverty episodes, we see that the proportion of the 
poor who are in long-term poverty decreases slightly over time from 47 to 
43 per cent between 1994 and 2003, and there is a corresponding increase in 
short-term poverty. Looking at poverty histories, on the other hand, we see a 
strong increase in long-term poverty among the poor until 2000, and a de-
crease after this year. The pattern for short-term poverty is almost exactly 
opposite. The difference in the patterns for histories and episodes reflects 
the fact that histories only summarize poverty up until the year in question, 
and thus strongly reflects the macro-economic conditions during the past 
five years. This means that the proportion long-term poor among the poor is 
higher the more the five-year-period overlaps with the deep recession 1991-
1997. When long-term poverty is defined in terms of concluded episodes 
(the shorter curves in Figure 8), we see instead a decreasing trend, which 
means that many of those who entered poverty during the final years of the 
recession managed to leave it rather quickly. 
It deserves mentioning that even though those in long-term poverty epi-
sodes make up a decreasing share of all poor during a given year, their pro-
portion is still very large: More than 40 per cent of all who are poor a given 
year are in an episode spanning five calendar years or more. At the same 
time, around half of those who ever enter poverty exit it again within a ca-
lendar year. This might seem contradictory, but is a correct characterization 
of poverty dynamics in Sweden: Most of those who become poor exit quick-
ly, and the stock of poor at a given time consists to a large extent of people 
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Figure 9. Re-entry to absolute poverty 
Proportion of different exit cohorts that has re-entered to poverty by number of years since 
exit (year 0). Cohorts with exit years 1991 and 1992-2004 (every second year).  
 
 
Re-entry into poverty 
It is not always the case that an exit from poverty is an end to poverty, be-
cause exits may not be permanent – for vulnerable groups, temporary es-
capes from poverty and recurrent spells in poverty may be a reality. It is 
therefore also relevant to study the extent of re-entry into poverty. Figure 9 
shows how many of those who exited poverty a given year who had re-
lapsed at least once (one calendar year) into poverty after a given duration. 
To count as a re-entry, one single calendar year of poverty is sufficient, 
which means that far from all who re-enter will remain in poverty for the 
entire duration shown in the curves. 
Figure 9 reveals that the calendar year after the poverty exit, around 10 
per  cent have re-entered into poverty. Of those who exited 1991-1994, 
around half had re-entered into poverty after eight years, but the pace of re-
entry decreased strongly for later exit cohorts: Of those who exited poverty 
in 1998, only 30 per cent had re-entered after eight years, which is around 
20 percentage units less than for those who exited poverty in the early 
1990’s. This pattern reflects the higher risk of poverty (and thus re-entry) 
during the recession between 1991 and 1997. However, the pattern for the 
early 2000’s is surprising: Re-entry increases gradually for exit cohorts from 
1999. This cannot be explained by the business cycle, but is most likely due 
to the composition of the population of poor. 






























Poverty exits and duration in different population groups 
We know that certain groups, such as single parents and recent immigrants, 
have a higher degree of poverty than others – but do they also have longer 
poverty durations? Here, we focus on the differences between immigrants 
and Swedish-born, and between different family types. Poverty episodes for 
immigrants are divided into two categories: those that start the year of im-
migration and those that start some other year. New immigrants that are 
poor their first calendar year in Sweden will thus be in the first category 
until their first poverty exit.
6
As above, an individual can contribute several poverty episodes to the 
analysis. If a new immigrant leaves poverty and re-enters it some later year, 
the first episode will be classified as an episode starting at the year of immi-
gration, while the second episode will be classified as a poverty period not 
starting the immigration year. As regards family types, we study the proba-
bility of poverty for individuals in a given family type at a given duration of 
poverty: The individual may not have had the same family type during the 
entire poverty episode. For example, the exit rate for single mothers six 
years after poverty entry is the exit rate among all those who were single 
mothers six years after poverty entry, whether or not they were single moth-
ers the preceding years. All analyses use individual-level data, so the results 
concern dynamics for individuals in certain types of households – not dy-
namics of households.  
  
Figure 10 shows that Swedish-born leave poverty quicker than immi-
grants, and new immigrants have a slower outflow than other immigrants. 
The year after the poverty entry, half of the Swedish-born and 60-70 per 
cent of immigrants remain in poverty. Ten years after the poverty entry, 3.5 
per cent of the Swedish-born remain in poverty, while 9-12 per cent of im-
migrants do so. Analyses not shown here demonstrate that the probability of 
re-entry is much higher among immigrants: Four years after the poverty 
exit, almost 30 per cent of Swedish-born but 50 per cent of immigrants have 
re-entered poverty. 
There are no large differences in poverty durations between individuals in 
different family types, but those who live alone remain in poverty somewhat 
longer than individuals that live with a partner (results not shown). Re-entry 
shows larger differences: Individuals in couple households (with and with-
out children) have the lowest rate of re-entry to poverty, and single parents 
with children have the highest rate of re-entry. After four years, 30 per cent 
of those with a partner and 33 per cent of singles without children had be-
come poor again, compared to around 40 per cent of single parents with 
children. 
                                                 
 
6 Immigration year is defined as the year when permanent residence permit was granted. 
People may have lived in Sweden (sometimes up to several years) while waiting for the 
residence permit.   
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Figure 10. Outflow from absolute poverty for Swedish- and foreign-born 




Turning to poverty episodes, Figure 11 shows the probability of long-term 
episodes (at least five calendar years) for individuals in different family 
types. Singles have the highest risk of long-term poverty. In 2003, which is 
the latest year that we can study long-term poverty, single mothers with 
young children had the highest rate of long-term poverty (6 per cent), fol-
lowed by singles without children (4.5 per cent) and single fathers with 
children (4 per cent). Individuals in married and cohabiting couples with 
young children also had a rather high rate of long-term poverty (around 2.5 
per cent). Together, this means that long-term poverty is a reality for a sub-
stantial proportion of young children in Sweden. Poverty risks are small for 
individuals with children aged 18 or over, which is probably partly due to 
the fact that parents in these households are older and therefore have higher 
incomes. Long-term poverty has decreased for individuals in all family 
types since 1997-2001. The smallest relative decrease was for single fathers, 
who have had an almost constant and rather high poverty level. 
We can also turn the perspective around and study the composition of the 
group of long-term poor (Figure 12). This question is relevant if one wants 
to identify the groups that should be targeted if long-term-poverty is to be 
efficiently reduced. Several of the high-risk groups that we have identified 
are too small to constitute a large proportion of the long-term poor: For ex-
ample, single fathers have a high risk of long-term poverty but are so few 
that they make up only 1.5 per cent of all long-term poor in 2003. Not more 
than 10 per cent of the long-term poor are single mothers, despite their high 
risk of experiencing long-term poverty. Instead, the group of long-term poor 
is dominated by singles without children, who make up more than half of all 
long-term poor.  
 









































Figure 11. Long-term poverty for individuals in different family types 1994–
2003 










Figure 12. Family types among the long-term poor 1994–2003 
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Figure 13. Long-term poverty and immigrants 
Proportion long-term poor (episodes of at least 5 years) among immigrants and Swedish-
born and proportion immigrants among long-term poor. Persons 16 years and older in own 
households 1994-2003.  
 
 
Among immigrants, long-term poverty has decreased both among new 
immigrants and others (Figure 13). In 1994, 10 per cent of immigrants and 3 
per cent of Swedish-born were long-term poor, and the corresponding pro-
portions in 2003 were 8 and 2 per cent. At the same time, the proportion 
immigrants among the long-term poor has increased steadily over the pe-
riod, from 31 per cent in 1994 to 40 per cent in 2003. So, even though long-
term poverty has decreased among immigrants, their share of the long-term 
poor has increased.  
Our focus here has been on differences between family types and immi-
grant groups, but it deserves mentioning that as regards age, the situation for 
young adults appears much less adverse when we study poverty longitudi-
nally instead of cross-sectionally. While young adults have very high pover-
ty rates, they are only slightly over-represented in long-term poverty. Thus, 
it appears that poverty for young adults is mostly a short-term experience.  
Exits from and durations of Social Assistance recipiency  
Entries to and exits from social assistance usually follow the general poverty 
pattern. Andrén and Gustafsson (2004) showed that the average time in SA 
was two years, but in a given year half of those receiving SA had received it 
for at least five years. Re-entry was shown to be substantial: 50 per cent of 
those with only one calendar year of SA re-entered within ten years, and in 
total two thirds of those who received SA a given year received it at least 
one additional year during the following ten years. Bergmark and Bäckman 
(2001) found that those who received SA at least ten months during a calen-
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Around 95 per cent received SA the following year and between 50 and 70 
per cent received SA during at least 10 months also this year.
7
In this section, we study the duration of SA recipiency, its changes over 
time and differences between groups – continuing our focus on differences 
between immigrants and Swedish-born, and between individuals in different 
family types. Regarding exits from SA for cohorts with different start-years 
(Figure 14), we see the same pattern as for poverty above: The 1991 entry 
cohort exits SA at a slow pace – after six years 20 per cent remain with SA. 
The exit rate increases for entry-cohorts up to 1997, when it starts slowing 
down again: Those who entered SA in 2001 and 2003 left it at the same low 
rate as those who entered it in 1993 and 1995, during the recession. 
 
As was the case for poverty (Figure 10), immigrants leave SA at a slower 
rate than Swedish-born (Figure 15), and it appears particularly difficult to 
exit SA spells that started the year of immigration. One explanation is that 
new immigrants normally lack alternative sources of income, while other 
groups can receive unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, pensions etc. 
This is supported by comparing figures 10 and 15, as the differences be-
tween new immigrants and others are not as large for exits from poverty as 
for exits from SA recipiency. 
 
Figure 14. Outflow from Social Assistance 
Proportion of different entry cohorts that remain in Social Assistance by number of years 
since entry. Cohorts with entry years 1991-2003 (every second year). Persons 16 years and 




                                                 
 
7 This high persistence must be seen in light of the fact that benefit periods often stretch out 
over two calendar years (especially when the study is based on those who have had at least 













































Figure 15. Outflow from Social Assistance among immigrants and Swedish-
born.  
Proportion remaining in Social Assistance by number of years since entry. Persons 16 years 




One can compare not only the level of exits from SA, but also the pattern 
of exits over time. The SA durations for Swedish-born and non-new immi-
grants have an exit rate that is decreasing over time, that is, the probability 
of exiting SA is high at first, but decreases strongly with time on SA. Long-
term SA recipiency is thus related to a lower probability of finding other 
sources of income. There is no definite explanation of this pattern: It can be 
that the time on SA affects opportunities and motivation to find other in-
comes (state dependence), but it can also be that those on long-term SA 
have a lower probability of exiting to begin with because of some underly-
ing characteristic (a selection effect). 
The exit pattern for new immigrants is very different: The exit rate is al-
most constant up to very long durations (ten years or more), and we see no 
gradual decrease in the exit probability. This constant exit rate is probably 
the result of two counteracting mechanisms: On the one hand, time on SA is 
(as for others) probably related to a decreasing probability of exit, but on the 
other hand, time since immigration is related to an increasing probability of 
exit. Because the time on SA coincides completely with the time since im-
migration, these two mechanisms balance, resulting in a constant rate of 
exit. Even though the level of SA recipiency is high for episodes starting the 
year of immigration, it must be considered positive that the time on SA is 
not associated with an increasing risk of remaining in SA, as it is for other 
SA recipients. 
As regards re-entry (not shown), immigrants have a higher re-entry rate 
than Swedish-born. After exiting from SA, it takes 13 years for Swedish-














































Figure 16. Outflow from Social Assistance in different family types.  
Proportion remaining in Social Assistance by year since entry. 
 
 
Of all family types, single mothers remain longest in SA (Figure 16). 
Partnered parents also have an initially low outflow, but while 10 per cent of 
single mothers remain in SA after 11-16 years, only around 5 per cent of 
parents in couples do so. The differences in poverty persistence are even 
more evident if we consider re-entry (not shown): After exiting SA, it takes 
only 4 years until half of the single mothers have re-entered, compared to 7 
years for single fathers, 10 years for singles without children, 13 years for 
partnered parents and 16 years for partnered individuals without children.  
As for absolute poverty (Figure 8), we can look upon persistence in SA in 
terms of histories and episodes. Figure 17 shows that around half of those 
who receive SA in a given year are in a long-term episode. Importantly, 
long-term SA episodes have not decreased much after the 1990’s recession 
– the 2003 level is higher than the one in 1994 (during the recession). This 
pattern deviates from the one for absolute poverty, where the proportion of 
the poor that was in long-term episodes decreased after the recession. 
While the proportion of all SA recipients that are long-term recipients has 
increased, the proportion of the entire population that are long-term SA re-
cipients has decreased somewhat. In 2003, 2 per cent of the population were 
long-term SA recipients, as compared to 3 per cent in 1994. Even though 
this is a small group, long-term SA makes up a large proportion of the total 
SA payments, which means that a large proportion of these benefits goes to 
a rather small group of recipients. 
Differences between groups are similar for long-term SA and long-term 
poverty. Long-term SA has decreased since the end of the recession among 
Swedish-born and immigrants, and in all family types, but immigrants and 
singles without children make up increasing proportions of the long-term 












































Figure 17. Short and long durations in Social Assistance 
Percentage short-term (1 year) and long-term (5 years) Social Assistance recipients. Reci-
piency histories (1994-2007) and assistance episodes (1994-2003). Persons 16 years and 




In our data, we cannot see whether the proportion long-term SA recipients 
in the population has returned to the levels before the recession. Several 
previous studies, with other definitions of long-term SA, have found that the 
proportion long-term SA recipients of the population was clearly higher 
2000-2005 than in 1990-1991, even though the proportion SA recipients in 
the population has decreased (Socialstyrelsen 2006, 2007, 2008, Bergmark 
and Bäckman 2007). Many have expressed a concern over this develop-
ment, but it must be understood as a consequence of the change of the popu-
lation composition during the period. Immigration was large during the 
1990’s, and new immigrants normally lack access to social insurances (such 
as sickness benefits, parental leave benefits, pensions, unemployment insur-
ance) which means that they have to resort to SA when lacking labour in-
come. Mood (2009) shows that around half of the total increase in long-term 
SA since 1991 is explained by the increased representation of immigrants in 
the population, 38 per cent is explained by an increasing dependence among 
immigrants (most likely because the proportion new immigrants has in-
creased), and 15 per cent is caused by increased dependence among Swe-
dish-born. It is of course alarming that a large group of immigrants are long-
term SA recipients, but Swedish-born can be equally poor without having to 
apply for SA because they receive other benefits. An upshot of this situation 
is that while immigrants are over-represented in both long-term poverty and 
long-term SA, their overrepresentation is much larger in long-term SA. 
Concluding discussion   
In the first section, we showed that the annual poverty rate during the period 
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longitudinal data on income and poverty, we found that most of those who 
ever became poor during this period exited poverty within a calendar year, 
and the risk of long-term poverty was small: Around 3-4 per cent of the 
population in a given year were long-term poor (defined as being poor for 
five consecutive years). However, of those poor in a given year, around 40 
per cent were in a long-term poverty episode (of five years or more). Of 
those who exited poverty, many returned: Seven years after exit, between 30 
per cent (those who exited in 1998) and 50 per cent (those who exited in 
1992) had experienced a new poverty spell. Poverty is sticky, but our ana-
lyses cannot ascertain whether it is because of some underlying characteris-
tic of the poor, or whether poverty itself has such detrimental effects. 
As we saw in Section 2, poverty is strongly related to the business cycle, 
and this is true also for poverty dynamics. In good times, the probability of 
leaving poverty or SA increases and durations become shorter. However, 
relapses to poverty do not follow this pattern: Re-entry to poverty decreased 
among those who exited poverty between 1992 and 1998, but increased 
from 1998 onwards. 
Our results show that immigrants have longer durations and a higher risk 
of falling back into poverty, and this pattern is particularly strong for recent 
immigrants.  The proportion long-term poor among immigrants has de-
creased since the recession, but the proportion immigrants among the long-
term poor has increased from 30 to 40 per cent the last decade. Thus, pover-
ty is becoming more concentrated to immigrants. This is true also for SA: 
Of those who were in a long-term SA episode at the end of the period, no 
less than 60 per cent were immigrants.  
Another group with a high risk for long-term and repeated poverty is sin-
gle mothers with young children. The risk of long-term poverty in this group 
is twice the risk in the entire population. Of all poor, this group does how-
ever make up only 10 per cent. Instead, the group of long-term poor is dom-
inated by one-adult households without children. This, in turn, is a rather 
heterogenous group, with roughly equal shares women and men, and only a 
slight over-representation of the youngest and the oldest.  
4. Transmission of income and poverty from 
parents to children 
A crucial aspect of poverty is to what extent it is inherited between parents 
and children – the more it is inherited, the less fair a society appears. Pre-
vious studies have documented that those who grow up in poverty have a 
higher risk of becoming poor as adults themselves (Corcoran 2005; Sten-
berg 2000). Such an intergenerational association is often taken as an indi-
cator of inequality of opportunity, and is studied within a wider research 
field addressing the transmission of resources across generations, for exam-
ple social mobility (Breen and Jonsson 2005) and income mobility 
(Björklund and Jäntti 2009).  
Due to their size, coverage, and precision, register data in Sweden (just 
like in other Nordic countries, and Canada) offer unusually good opportuni-
ties for studying the transmission of socioeconomic positions, income and  
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poverty across generations (Björklund, Lindahl, and Plug 2006; Bratsberg et 
al. 2007; Corak and Heisz 1999; Jonsson et al. 2009). Most previous studies 
have been concerned with social and income mobility in general and have 
not focused on poverty. One study, however, looks at the relation between 
parent’s and son’s income for different levels of parental income in the 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Finland) and when  comparing 
with England and the USA they find a weaker intergenerational transmis-
sion of low incomes in the Nordic countries (Bratsberg et al. 2007).  
Our analytical strategy falls into two parts, one concerned with the exces-
sive risks for poverty that may prevail for those from economically disad-
vantaged backgrounds; the other with change over time. For the former aim, 
we ask, first, what the overall association between parents’ and children’s 
income is. Second, we study mobility between decile groups (parents’ and 
children’s, respectively) to find out whether those who grew up in the poor-
est tenth of the income distribution have particularly small chances of leav-
ing poverty. Third, we take this one step further by asking whether those 
who grew up in families at the very bottom of the income distribution (de-
fined in terms of percentile groups) stand out as having exceptionally large 
risks of ending up in poverty themselves. 
Just as in the previous sections, we are interested in change over time. We 
take as a point of departure a similar time-period as analyzed in Section 2 
and 3 above, namely (approximately) 1995 to 2005 (by studying those born 
1960-70 at ages 33-37). We are interested in whether there was any discern-
ible impact of the recession and, perhaps, of the economic recovery during 
the most recent period, on intergenerational mobility. We know from earlier 
studies that social mobility has increased in Sweden during the post-War 
period (Erikson 1983), but that this equalization leveled off during the 
1980s and 1990s (Jonsson 2004). In a related research area, it has been 
shown that the importance of social origin on educational attainment has 
decreased for children born from the 1920s and up to the 1950s, but this 
trend has also leveled off for younger generations (Jonsson  and Erikson 
2000). A similar trend has been reported for the association between par-
ents’ and children’s incomes (Björklund, Jäntti, and Lindqvist 2009). Be-
cause trends in intergenerational processes are to a large extent produced by 
cohort replacement, it is likely that they are quite slow (Breen and Jonsson 
2007), but as we study a relatively small age band it is still possible to ex-
plore any instantaneous impact of macro-economic change with some preci-
sion. 
For the analyses we use (just as in the previous section) the STAR register 
data base, which allows us to connect data on parents and children via a 
unique individual identifier in Statistics Sweden’s multi-generation register. 
Previous research in income mobility has mostly been concerned with the 
association between fathers’ and sons’ labour incomes. Particularly when 
the issue is poverty, we find it preferable to study income mobility in a more 
comprehensive way by using the household disposable incomes, just as we 




The income growth for people from different economic back-
grounds 
The question of the intergenerational transmission of income and poverty is 
important but difficult to study. One reason is that few data sets have infor-
mation from two generations who are at around the same ages. To capture 
generational differences in life-time income it is also important to measure 
income at an age when each generation has reached a relatively stable in-
come level (approaching what the economists call “permanent income”). 
Both studies of socioeconomic positions (Jonsson 2001) and income 
(Böhlmark and Lindqvist 2006) suggest that such a level of “maturity” is 
reached somewhere between 30 and 40 years of age. In addition, when 
studying income (in difference to occupation) it is very important to include 
several years of income to reduce the risk that one registers temporary devi-
ations in income, due to a sudden drop or increase in income or because of 
measurement error, something that leads to an under-estimation of the inter-
generational income association (e.g., Solon 1999; Corak and Heisz 1999). 
We have access to register information on incomes during the period 
1968–2007. With these data we can study the association between parents’ 
and children’s incomes for cohorts born between 1960 and 1970. We meas-
ure parental income during 1968 to 1985, averaging over the period when 
the children were 8-15 years of age. The children’s incomes are measured 
1993-2007, that is, when they were 33-37 years of age. To gain precision in 
our estimates, we use the average of the positive incomes of parents and 
children over these eight and five years, respectively.
8 The foundation is, as 
in our previous analyses, the equivalized, disposable household income.
9
A first question is whether there are any noticeable differences between 
children of different economic backgrounds in income growth over their 
early career. Is it the case that children from poor homes experience a slow 
income career themselves compared to those from more fortunate income 
origins? If so, when in the income career does this difference occur? Figure 
18 displays the income development for the child generation when these 
were in the ages 18-47 (provided that they have formed their own house-
hold). The point of departure is the relative income position during child-
hood. We have divided those born 1960-70 into ten equal-sized (decile-) 
groups (thus we use a different definition of relative poverty than in pre-
vious sections). The reference group, those coming from the lowest (poor-
est) income decile group, has been set to zero, that is, they are represented 
by the horizontal bold (red) line in the graph. They have also experienced 
income growth during the ages 18-47, but we have set them to zero each 
 As 
before, we exclude self-employed from our analyses, because their regis-
tered incomes are no good estimates of their real economic situation. 
                                                 
 
8 Because we use disposable incomes, there is hardly any household with zero or negative 
values. 
9 The main reason for using household income in the child’s generation is that this is what 
is relevant for poverty. It should be noted that this also brings in the spouse’s income. As a 
consequence, we study the “total” intergenerational association, which also captures paren-
tal resources as materialized in residential location, social networks, school choice, and 
other characteristics that influence the spouse-selection process.  
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year because we then can illustrate the change in income differences across 
ages. 
Figure 18 shows that by the age of 30 those whose parents belonged to 
the highest decile group had more than 40,000 SEK more in equivalized 
disposable income than the reference group from the poorest decile group. 
The general picture that stands out from Figure 18 is one of growing income 
gaps, implying that the intergenerational income association increases with 
children’s age. The pattern we see can however not easily be generalized in 
its detail to other cohorts than those born 1960-70, who attended the labour 
market at a certain historical time at a given age.
10
 
 What we believe is poss-
ible to generalize though, is the fanning out of the differences, that is, the 
increasing income origin differences facing a cohort of children as they 
grow older. This “gradual inheritance” of parents’ income positions shows 
that for every age older than 25 those who experienced a relatively poor 
upbringing lag more and more behind those from richer backgrounds (cf. 
Erikson and Jonsson 1998). 
Figure 18. The development of intergenerational income differences from age 
18 to age 46 
Income differences among children (born 1960-70) from different income deciles (parents’ 
income when the child was 8-15 years of age). Equivalized disposable incomes adjusted to 
2007 price level. SEK.  
 
 
   
                                                 
 
10 In fact, we have studied the pattern in more detail, and conclude that it is produced by a 
complex mix of age, period, and cohort effects. 
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The pattern in Figure 18 is interesting also in its details. The income dif-
ferences widen dramatically between 25 and 30 years of age, approximately. 
Before the age of 25, it is hardly possible to discern any intergenerational 
income association. In fact, up to age 20, those from the highest income 
background are the worst off – no doubt because they are still in higher edu-
cation (where we saw above that poverty is common) while those of other 
income origins have their first jobs. The educational investment pays off 
quite well, according to our estimates, as those from the richest tenth have 
left the others behind already at age 30, their income advantage growing 
further as they grow older. 
The results suggest that the association between parents’ and children’s 
incomes is possible to study when the children are around 35 years old, as 
we do below. The association is likely to increase as these children age – at 
least up to their mid-40s – but at around 35 it is, we believe, sufficiently 
representative to use for our purposes. 
The association between parents’ and children’s incomes 
Has the association between parents’ and children’s income increased or 
decreased during the last decades? When measuring this intergenerational 
association, economists normally use the elasticity, which is the regression 
coefficient of parents’ income on child’s income (where incomes are trans-
formed using the natural logarithm) (Solon 1999). The elasticity can be in-
terpreted as the fraction of the income differences in the parental generation 
that is transmitted to children. 
However, the elasticity, while an important measure in itself, is partly de-
termined by changes in the distribution of incomes across generations. If the 
variance in income grows, for example, the elasticity is likely to increase 
too. If we want to capture the underlying association, we can control for the 
changes in the spread of income by calculating the intergenerational corre-
lation (which is the elasticity multiplied by the ratio of the variance in par-
ents’ income to child’s income). The correlation is thus more closely related 
to what is often termed inequality of opportunity, interpreted as differences 
between children of different origins in the probabilities of reaching given 
positions (in this case, income positions).  
In Figure 19 we show the change in both the elasticity and the correlation 
for those born 1960-70 – and as we use children’s incomes in the ages 33-
37, in historical time Figure 19 corresponds approximately to the period 
1995-2005. Because we use household income the estimates are the same 
for men and women by definition.  
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Figure 19. Intergenerational income* association in terms of elasticities and 
correlations for birth cohorts 1960-1970 
Parents’ income measured when the child was 8–15 years of age, and the child’s income as 
adult measured as the average of income for ages 33–37.  
 
* Equivalized disposable income 
 
The intergenerational elasticity has increased from 0.18 for those born in 
1960 to 0.24 for those born in 1970, which is no small growth in the trans-
mission of advantages across generations. However, the increasing elasticity 
does not tell the whole story. In fact, the reason why it increases is that the 
variance in income increased during the period. As we saw in the analyses 
in Section 2 above, income inequality has increased since the mid 1990s, 
and this is also true for those 33-37 years of age. This increasing variance in 
child income across cohorts means that it takes less of an income advantage 
during childhood to produce a given proportional income advantage among 
children.  
When we hold constant for the change in the spread in income – by calcu-
lating the intergenerational income correlation – the change over time is 
instead in the opposite direction: The intergenerational income correlation 
fell from a good 0.20 to a good 0.17 during our period (circa 1995-2005), 
meaning that the proportion of children’s income that can be accounted for 
by parents’ income decreased.
11
It should be noted that our conclusions relate to household income, which 
we have argued is especially appropriate when studying poverty. However, 
we have also conducted the trend analysis using household incomes for par-
 It would thus seem to be the case that in-
equality of opportunity decreased during the period while the  economic 
consequence of this inequality worked in the other direction, to widen the 
income differences among children from different income origins.  
                                                 
 
11 To check whether this decrease is due to changes in the intergenerational relation be-
tween particularly high or low incomes we divided the incomes (in both generations) into 
percentile groups and calculated the cohort-specific correlations. While these are slightly 















ents (as in Figure 19) but the individual disposable income for their child-
ren. This analysis (not shown here) reveals that the trend for men is identical 
to the trend using household income, but that there is no discernable trend 
for women. 
Although  previous research (e.g., Solon 2002; Jäntti et al. 2006)  has 
shown the parental income effect to be substantially stronger in the USA 
and Germany, and probably England as compared to the Nordic countries, 
our estimates verify that there is a fairly strong association between parents’ 
and children’s incomes also in Sweden.
12 The degree to which this associa-
tion is based on a causal effect of parents’ income on children’s is difficult 
to establish, because the association captures also the effect of several other 
factors related to fathers income, such as parents’ education, and cognitive 
as well as non-cognitive traits (e.g., Mood, Jonsson, and Bihagen 2010).
13
As mentioned, intergenerational associations are probably driven mainly 
by cohort processes (Breen and Jonsson 2007). However, more detailed ana-
lyses (not shown here) reveal that also period effects are behind the devel-
opment in Figure 19. The intergenerational income association can, via dif-
ferent mechanisms, be strengthened or weakened at the same historical point 
in time for people of different ages. For example, changes in taxation regu-
lations may make it profitable to take home capital profits a given year (cf. 
Figure 2), and if such profits largely go to children to high-income earners, 
this can give rise to a period effect. 
 
Our results suggest that the intergenerational income mobility increased 
recently in Sweden, thereby equalizing opportunities, which is a remarkable 
and surprising result, contrasting the increasing income inequality shown in 
Section 1. Falling intergenerational income correlations may stem from an 
increasing  general  equality during childhood,  in our case between the 
1960s/70s and 1970s/80s, so a given sum of money among parents have 
come to “buy” less advantage for children. This can be the case if welfare 
state provision expanded, or if higher education became more available, 
which demonstrates that equality of opportunity is not only a matter of in-
comes (e.g., Solon 2004).  
Income mobility with focus on low- and high-income earners 
A disadvantage with the approach used so far, centered on the intergenera-
tional income elasticity and correlation, is the underlying assumption that 
the relation is linear, that is, that a given income increase in the parental 
generation generates the same income increase in the filial generation irres-
pective of whether it takes place at high or low incomes. 
                                                 
 
12 However, our estimate is not so easy to compare with international estimates as those 
often pertain to father-son (or, in rare cases, father-daughter) correlations. The father-son 
correlation using only labour income is higher than our estimates, around 0.3 (see Mood, 
Jonsson, and Bihagen 2010, for those born 1962-65 studied at age 38-42 with fathers’ in-
comes averaged over the ages 44-55). 




Because we are especially interested in whether children who grow up in 
poverty face distinctive disadvantages, we divide the income distribution 
into ten (decile) groups for both generations and focus on those in the low-
est, that is, those who are poorest. Figure 20 shows the proportion of the 
children growing up in households with different incomes who themselves 
end up in different income decile groups as adults. If there were no associa-
tion between parents’ income and children’s, the bars would all represent 10 
per cent probabilities. 
The graph clearly demonstrates that there is, by and large, a gradually in-
creasing probability to end up in lower income deciles the lower income the 
parents had. If we focus on the lowest destination decile group (the front left 
set of [pink] bars) we see that the proportion who end up there is somewhat 
higher among those who themselves come from poorer circumstances than 
what we would expect from a linear relationship (the nearest [pink] bar). 
The deviation from a linear trend is however greatest for those who grew up 
in high-income families. In particular, those who come from the richest ten 
per cent of the origin families have very low risks of ending up in the lowest 
decile group and rather extreme chances of find themselves among the top 
ten per cent (the tall [light blue] bar at the far end of the graph). This result 
mirrors one that is also shown in studies of social mobility – the intergenera-
tional association is stronger at the top than at the bottom. The inheritance 
of privileges is of course an example of inequality, but if we take the pers-
pective of the children it is still positive that poverty is less inherited than 
affluence. 
 
Figure 20. Intergenerational income mobility between income decile groups 
The proportion of those born 1960-70 growing up in different income deciles (age 8-15) who 





















Did the deep recession during the first half of the 1990s increase the risk 
of ending up in poverty for those who grew up in the lowest income decile 
group? Did it reduce the chances of inheriting high-income positions? Fig-
ure 21 follows children who grew up in the lowest and highest income de-
cile group, respectively, and give the probabilities of being found in each of 
the ten income groups at age 33-37. Curves sloping downwards show the 
destination of those who grew up in the lowest income group, and we rec-
ognize the pattern from the previous graph (the nearest [pink] bars that slope 
down left). The focus of Figure 21 is instead to display this pattern (and the 
corresponding one for those of richer origins) for three different cohorts – 
those born in 1960, 1965, and 1970 – to trace changes over time. However, 
there are almost no changes across these cohorts, which can be seen by the 
overlaid three curves. This means that, with only small exceptions, the mo-
bility from the highest and lowest decile groups remained the same during 
the period under study. 
Around 15 per cent of those who grew up in the lowest decile group 
ended up there themselves. While that is higher than the expected 10 per 
cent (if income destinations had been uncorrelated with income origins) it is 
still not extraordinary high. But a decile group is quite heterogenous, and it 
would be interesting to know whether there is, within this group, a smaller 
group with an extremely poor childhood who perhaps do much worse. That 
is, the inheritance of poverty may be stronger for those growing up in the 
very poorest percentages of a cohort. To test this, we next study income 
mobility with income origin divided into percentiles (a hundred equally big 
groups).  
 
Figure 21. Change in intergenerational income mobility among those who 
grew up in the highest and lowest income decile, respectively.  
The proportion of children in different income deciles at age 33–37, shown for three different 
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 Figure 22 shows the average income during childhood and the average in-
come at age 33-37 for each of these percentile groups. Each dot represents a 
percentile group in parents’ income distribution, and the hundred dots form 
an upwardly sloping “row” along the horizontal x-axis showing the income 
during childhood. Along the vertical axis, we show the average income of 
the children themselves at age 33-37. 
The fact that the dots form an upward slope simply reiterates the fact that 
there is a positive association between parents’ income and children’s in-
come as adults. The distance between the dots in the horizontal dimension 
shows the absolute income differences during childhood between the per-
centile groups. It is interesting to see that parents in the highest percentile 
group (furthest to the right) are far away from the rest, but also that the low-
est-income group is lagging behind the next-lowest group. While that might 
be thought of as an indication of a division within the lowest decile group 
just analyzed (which we have indicated by a darker [red] colour of the ten 
leftmost dots in the graph), the consequences of belonging to this group do 
not seem to be overly negative. This can be seen by the fact that the place-
ment of the lowest percentile (the dot furthest to the left) is not much differ-
ent from the adjacent dots along the vertical dimension – though the dots 
form an upward slope also among the ten poorest percentiles. This means 
that the more-or-less linear (in fact smoothly upwardly convexing) relation 
between parental and filial incomes is preserved also at the very bottom of 
the income distribution.  
 
Figure 22. Intergenerational income mobility between percentile groups* 
Children born 1960–1970 
 
 
* Every dot represents a percentile group in parents’ income distribution 
 























































Parents' disposable equivalized income (SEK 2007) 
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Under condition that the lowest percentile groups do not contain house-
holds with unobserved economic resources, it appears that those who grew 
up in a family at the far left end of the income distribution do not have much 
lower average incomes than others whose childhood income was in the low-
est decile. That should not, however, conceal the fact that there is a general 
association between parents’ and children’s incomes, so it is worse being 
right at the end than being just near it. Again, however, we are more im-
pressed by the advantages passed on between generations: those who come 
from the highest percentile group do have a clear advantage also over those 
who come from the next-to-highest.  
Concluding discussion  
This section has demonstrated that there is an association between parents’ 
income during their offspring’s childhood (age 8-15) and the income this 
offspring achieves when grown up (age 33-37). The correlation (for house-
hold disposable equivalized income) is around 0.18 for the most recent pe-
riod, while the elasticity is around 0.24. These figures are not negligible, but 
do not represent great inequalities of opportunity.  
The probability of ending up in the lowest income groups decreases al-
most linearly with the income experienced during childhood. Those with the 
lowest incomes do not stand out as very different from those next to them in 
the income distribution. Instead, those who come from the real high-income 
families have an extra advantage – very high incomes, it seems, are more 
easily inherited than poverty. This separates the Nordic countries from the 
USA (and possibly England), where also the lowest income origins generate 
big disadvantages in relation to the adjacent income groups (Bratsberg et. al 
2007). In most of these studies, however, there remains some uncertainty 
about the measurement of those with the absolutely lowest incomes 
The inequality in income careers between children from different income 
backgrounds becomes visible first after the age of 25, to some extent be-
cause many children from high-income groups study at the university and 
therefore have low incomes in their early 20s. Between age 25 and 40 in-
come differences increase rapidly, and it is especially children from the 
most privileged income positions that leave the others behind. 
There is a tendency that the intergenerational income correlation falls be-
tween cohorts born 1960 and those born 1970, i.e., approximately between 
1995 and 2005. This is a surprising result which should be interpreted 
somewhat cautiously.
14
                                                 
 
14 For example, even if the data are of high quality, changes in taxation regulations make 
incomes difficult to make fully comparable over time. Also, household definitions are not 
fully reliable for some family types (e.g., non-married cohabitants with no common child-
ren). 
 If the equalization is real, it may stem from condi-
tions during the children’s upbringing that took place in the 1960s to the 
first half of the 1980s, a time period which was characterized by a general 
(and not only economic) equalization in Sweden (e.g., Erikson and Åberg 
1987). This speculation reminds us that changes in intergenerational income  
associations is merely one of several possible indicators of inequality of  
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opportunity, and private means and public expenditures are communicating 
vessels in this process. It is also important to note that the “income return” 
of parents’ income during childhood (the elasticity) increased during the 
period under study. Because income inequality grew, so did the advantage 
of coming from a high-income family in real monetary terms. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that the association between parents’ and child-
ren’s incomes not necessarily reflects a causal effect. Parents at the lowest 
income levels may have other characteristics that suppress their children’s 
educational careers and occupational and income attainments. For example, 
they often have lower education, and they may have less human capital in 
other respects too. As we have shown in previous sections, among those in 
poverty there is a large representation of immigrants, making it possible that 
labour market discrimination is behind a part of the intergenerational in-
come association. Only further research can shed light on which factors are 
of importance for inequality of opportunity, and changes in these. 
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